Analysis of Guardiola’s Barcelona Part Two: The 3-3-4

In his final season at Barcelona, Guardiola started to experiment and make deviations away from his 4-3-3. Possibly to increase the their attacking potential against teams who sat deep for 90 minutes, he brought in Cesc Fabregas to replace a full-back and play upfield alongside Messi alongside the addition of Alexis Sanchez as another option on the wings.

It is worth noting that this 3-4-3 system has been applied in teams of similar designs in the past, with Cruyff’s dream team – in which Guardiola flourished under the management of Cruyff.

In recent times, the system was very Bielsa-esque, with small things such as the ‘+1 rule’ in defence apparent and 3-1 in attack often being formed. El Loco has been one of Guardiola’s greatest influencers for his coaching career, as he spent a lot of his ‘transition’ period between playing and management studying coaches such as the Argentine.

Phase 1

With 3 permanent centre-backs, Barcelona’s system at the back was generally the in-possession shape of the standard 4-3-3, as Busquets played often in the middle of the back-3, where he would be as a pivot in phase 1.

As a result, the effect was generally the same as the 3 could stretch to cover the entire width of the field, often just deeper than the halfway line.

A more interesting facet of this system with 3 permanent centre-backs however, is the positioning of each wide centre-back. They were very effective against teams who sat deep and narrow (basically everyone aside from Bielsa’s Bilbao) as they opened up more passing lanes from the half spaces which allowed for vertical passes around the midfield block in order to progress the ball upfield.

1 – With Barcelona’s central overloads, the opposition are forced to become narrow themselves to try and make up for the roaming players adding to the existing 4 (diamond) in the centre.

2 – The back 3 allows the wide centre-backs Abidal (left) and Mascherano (right) to spread out and cover the width of the pitch whilst Busquets (centre) stays slightly deeper. In this example, Abidal is about to receive possession from Keita and he is positioned in the left half space, from here he has an excellent angle ‘around’ the villareal midfield line and can easily pass to either Thiago (more central) or Pedro (touchline) to progress the ball into phase 3 of possession.

3 – It should be noted that in this match, Villareal played in a 4-1-4-1 later on which gave more space in the half spaces for the opposition to exploit (as they used 1 pivot instead of 2) so this situation accentuated slightly however the meaning is the same.

Another main characteristic of the wide 3-man defence is their spatial coverage in relation to general ball circulation. By splitting the field into 3 spaces we have the standard centre and 2 wings (half spaces shaded). With the back 3 split, Barcelona have 1 defender in each zone (and wide centre-backs in half spaces so they still have 360’ of playing space and can support more centrally should a loss of possession occur. The tactically-excellent Busquets is needed in the centre given the higher demands with more players and less time on the ball in a role which would not be able to fulfilled by many. He is supported however, as Keita is the fixed pivot that isn’t available during these stages in a 4-3-3 and both Thiago and Xavi will drop deep to support.

As a permanent centre-back, Busquets sat a lot deeper than when is dropping into the backline as a pivot. This has a few effects, firstly it makes him more accessible to switch the play as he can move away from the opposition striker, however, more importantly he increases the playing space in which the likes of Xavi can operate in massively.

This was positionally one of the roles as the 6 in the team however he fulfils it slightly differently as a centre-back, however to greater success. By moving deeper, he increases the depth of the shape as he is (excluding the keeper) the deepest line. This not only gives more space to Xavi in that Busquets isn’t directly alongside him (which is what happened with him as a pivot), but gives the opposition forwards more space to cover which ultimately makes it more difficult to press.

1 – Busquets drops deeper out of the back 3 creating a diamond shape with Keita. By doing so he expands the depth of the team and gives them more space horizontally to play in. In addition Xavi drops as usual to make a 3-2 shape in front of the Villareal midfield.

2 – Villareal, as most teams, defended quite deep already as they took off a striker for an extra midfielder at half time.

3 – As a result of both actions, Barcelona’s space in front of Villareal’s midfield became very big and Rossi found it virtually impossible to press effectively as the space he had to cover was simply far too big.

Phase 2

A key aspect of Barcelona’s 2^nd phase in the 3-3-4 formation is the actions of the two wide central midfielders.

Both Thiago and Iniesta played slightly wider than the usual central midfield role and worked well getting involved in attacks in all areas. The above diagram shows then wide of the Villareal double pivot in the centre as their positions allow them to combine centrally but also with the wingers on the touchline.

As with the central midfield pairing in the 4-3-3, the orientations of Iniesta and Xavi/Thiago are quite different.

The latter rarely deviated from his right half-space and played quite vertically up and down the space. It was quite often he would receive the ball from the centre-back in the deep half-space in a similar fashion to how Xavi does so often but would also move higher and support the attack also.

An example of this was for Barcelona’s 1^st goal in their 5-0 demolition of Villareal at the start of the 2011/2012 season.

At the start of the attack we can see him in the right half space as Fabregas has dropped deep and received possession whilst the other false 9 Messi has moved wide near Thiago and Sanchez. Like I have previously mentioned, Thiago can from this position break free of the midfield and attack directly against the defensive line. He does exactly this and makes an excellent finish from the edge of the area.

On the other hand, Iniesta’s movement is much freer as to contain him to a more static position would be nonsensical. With the roaming of Iniesta (and the front 2), the diamond becomes much more flexible and generally better for things such as circulation and space coverage.

1 – Messi moves deeper in his false 9 position in response to Iniesta coming across to influence the attack on the right side.

2 – As Iniesta comes across, he creates a numerical advantage for Barcelona as Thiago sits deeper creating a 3v2 making it easier for them to play through the midfield which are protecting their defence.

This 3v2 situation allows them to find Iniesta through a small combination after he moves slightly deeper. In a tight situation Iniesta makes a quick combination with Fabregas who drags a centre-back out, then coming across back to the left, Iniesta plays Messi through with an immaculate through ball.

Phase 3

With the additional false 9, the changes between the 3-3-4 and the 4-3-3 are significant in the 3^rd phase of possession. The system places a heavy emphasis on the rotation of positions, giving the extra fluidity as Fabregas and Messi are given free roles to drift into whatever space.

The wing play is still the same, as either flank is covered constantly with Pedro and Sanchez (or Alves) sitting on the touchlines and stretching play as much as possible. This plays into Barcelona’s strengths as they can easily isolate the opposition full-back into 1v1 battles with the winger. By doing this, Barcelona can exploit the high level of technical ability in their players.

When defending against Barcelona, one of the key aspects is to keep a very compact shape, by dragging the full-back wide and creating the 1v1, they can easily disorganise the opponent and open up space.

The addition of Fabregas as an extra false 9 was interesting to say the least, especially given the transfer was initially as a future Xavi replacement. With an extra false 9, Messi was given more freedom and could move deep or wide with Fabregas still in the hole and vice versa.

It was common that Fabregas would drop to the 6 line and receive possession whilst Messi stayed relatively high to be the link through the centre.

1 – Fabregas dropping deeper than both Thiago and Fabregas as Keita drops deeper (A Busi-style move to create more space for the higher up midfielder).

2 – This leaves space open as the Villareal RCM and RM are occupied with Iniesta.

In this situation, Fabregas can move forward into the space provided which results in a (just) failed through ball as Iniesta made a run in behind and Messi moved the opposite way.

Another common sight was Messi and Fabregas both deep creating complete overloads in the centre as Barcelona could play through easily with short combinations.

1 – In this situation, both Messi and Fabregas have dropped deep into small pockets of space. Alongside Iniesta they try to pass through the opposition (which they do on this occasion).

2 – A typical sight with the 4-3-3, as the defensive line have no-one to mark which causes lots of issues – mainly due to the strangeness of the situation for the centre-backs and because the space around them will soon be attacked instead.

3 – In order to keep the opposition defensive line back, both wingers are as high as possible against them to make sure the opposition are as vertically uncompact as Barcelona can make them, giving more space for the central players.

Although Fabregas had a poor scoring record in front of goal, his presence in the 3-3-4 made them more effective against deeper teams as they held more central control due to his roaming centrally.

Another addition which influenced Messi’s game considerably was Alexis Sanchez. Signed from Udinese where he also played as a false 9, Sanchez featured completely on the wings, where he struggled to influence as much as he potentially could.

However he did rotate positions which Messi quite frequently. This brought the Argentine back to his first senior position at right wing as he looked to exploit the pockets of space opened up by ball circulation of the deeper midfielders.

The real threat in these situations however was of Sanchez. An excellent dribbler with great pace, he would often be the only high central player in the side as both Messi and Fabregas would move out, giving him the space he is so threatening and often taking the centre-back by surprise with his horizontal movement inside.

1 – With Messi and Fabregas drifted away (on the opposite flanks), the 9/10 space is completely open with the centre-backs marking no-one and a poor midfield organisation in general.

2 – This is an open invitation for Sanchez to move horizontally inside in rotation with Messi as he can exploit the space with his pace and explosive dribbling.

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PART ONE