Analysis of Guardiola’s Barcelona Part 1

In this analysis I will look to break down the best team of my 17 year lifetime, looking largely on Barcelona in possession with a particular focus to the world-beating midfield of Busquets, Xavi and Iniesta. The analysis has been taken from about 6 games from 2008-2011, including the famous 5-0 Manita. It has been necessary to split the work into two sections due to the length, with the second focusing on Guardiola’s 3-3-4 system in his final season in Catalonia.

The Pivot

One development through Guardiola’s tenure was the use of the 6 player between the standard lines of defence and midfield. The pivot in ‘Pep’s first year was generally Yaya Touré, as Busquets was officially in the team but yet to be fully integrated into the starting 11. With Touré, Barcelona had a player who’s strengths were in driving forward as he has done for the past seasons in Manchester, and the role he performed in Guardiola’s first season was largely different to Busquets’ for all other years

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1 – In Barcelona’s 1^st phase, the centre-backs began to split immediately under Guardiola’s instruction; however it wasn’t often that the pivot would drop to split them and support the development from defence through midfield.

2 – As the diagram shows, Touré instead stayed quite higher which made him easier to cut out of the build-up. In deep situations such as this one however, Valdes could be used to switch possession though in higher up areas, it caused issues.

1 – Dropping deep, Busquets vacates the standard defensive midfield position to create a situational-back 3 increasing the coverage of space horizontally across the back line (excluding Valdes).

2 – Through dropping back, Busquets creates massive amounts of space for Xavi following the Cruijff rule that sometimes the best way to help a player is by moving away from him (especially when the player is Xavi).

With Busquets between the centre-backs, the 3-man defence were able to spread effectively whilst maintaining the central point which is a key space for build-up. Especially when that player is the genius that is Sergio Busquets, who’s intelligence allows the likes of Xavi and Iniesta to dominate the midfield ahead of him.

In ‘Busi’, Barcelona had a player who from the start understood the system perfectly, fitting in to one of the most key positions in the 4-3-3 formation. In the below example, his intelligence is on show as he makes a slight adjustment to his position which gives Iniesta the space he needs to progress the play into the 2^nd phase of possession.

Busquets’ passing is quite vertically oriented, as he generally looks to forward the ball onto Xavi and Iniesta ahead of him. Due to his role in Barcelona’s 1^st phase build up, it is of high importance that his positioning is near perfect for them to effectively direct the ball through him.

1 – Malaga have looked to press Barcelona on the wing but due to the excellent short passing and pressing resistance of Barcelona players failed, after a short combination, they look to pass to Busquets in space. In pressing, Malaga have committed their midfield to the flank.

2 – Realising the situation, Busquets offers himself in a position where he has a full scope of the space that Barcelona can exploit, so in 2 sharp passes they have bypassed Malaga’s midfield and can go forward against the defensive line.

Here is another example of his positioning.

1 – In order to better his effectiveness of forwarding play with a vertical pass, Busquets will sit between the opposition pressers and look to play 3^rd line passes upfield.

2 – This is assisted by the intelligent positioning of both Xavi and Iniesta – the pair will generally sit in the midfield channels with their back to goal. Although this maybe a difficult position to receive possession for most, they can often dribble out of the press with relative ease.

3 – One of the most noted aspects of this setup is the triangle that Busi forms with the centre-backs, this makes it so if the Valencia defenders do well and press to cover the vertical pass, Busquets can simply make a wall pass to the free centre-back, from where Barcelona can look to attack in another space.

During Barcelona’s 3^rd and 4^th phases of possession, Busi retains an important role in the organisation of the team and more so the circulation of possession. Sitting deep as the single pivot, Busquets will work as a regista, recycling possession and distributing the ball well as he oversees his teammates in attack.

The necessity of a player with his intelligence to perform this role is great, as he often dictates the ball and needs to know which spaces to circulate the ball into. The majority of the time his passes move wide where there will nearly always be a player stretching the opposition block. In addition he is always nearby as a pressure relief if a player is in danger of losing possession.

Although Xavi often plays deep during the early phases of Barcelona’s possession, Busquets’ controlling position in their 3^rd and 4^th phases allows his teammate to hold an advanced position (which will be discussed later).

Finally, a key aspect of Busquets’ positioning in Barcelona’s later phases comes into play during the defensive transition. The midfielder is an excellent presser of the ball and covers space better than anyone in the world, so when the ball is cleared, Busi is often on hand to intercept and continue the possession.

What is more important however is his counter-pressing. Busquets is often primed to press an opposition from behind and often is successful in that he either regains possession or fouls the opponent to help his team regain organisation.

 

Xavi

Although Touré didn’t offer a very good passing option as the central pivot, the results (or lack of) weren’t too significant as Xavi was often dropping deeper and he would often rotate with the now-Manchester City midfielder.

The most common area in which he would move to was the deep right half space. In this area, he became very difficult to press as a player must come out of his standard position to meet him. In addition, being in the half space opens up the passing options through the opposition midfield line which makes finding the pass even easier for the midfielder.

When Busquets came into the side and Guardiola had a better pivot in general, Xavi carried less responsibility to drop deep and aid circulation. However there were still a few situations in which he would drop to become a second pivot.

One was if Barcelona had a sustained period of possession in phases 1 and 2, but failed to progress up field whether it be due to a good opposition organisation or generally poor circulation of the ball. In these cases, Xavi would play quite direct and most of the time would spray the ball wide to a player on the touchline or look to play a vertical pass over the top. His presence alone helps Barcelona secure the ball more confidently, from which a foundation is created that they can build upon.

1 – With Madrid’s 4-4-2 shape, the half space opens up for Xavi to drop inside and receive the ball as Barcelona are in their 1^st phase of possession.

2 – This is assisted by the back 3 being formed with Abidal staying deep. This allows Busquets, who might otherwise have dropped deep, to be more engaged in the midfield instead which means the RM forwards have a more difficult job of tracking two players.

In these positions, Xavi can use his superior distribution to allow his team to progress forward.

 

Here is an example of Xavi dropping deep as Barcelona struggle to circulate the ball through the opposition midfield block. An interesting side note is Busquets’ wide positioning from his original central role, this not only provides Xavi with more room but offers an option to pass around the opposition midfield line through the half space.

In the 3^rd phase of possession, Xavi has the freedom to play much higher up as Busquets can generally hold the pivot role on his own. Although the midfielder is more renowned for his excellent long passing from deep, his talent is still excellent in an attacking midfield position.

This showed during the 5-0 defeat of Barcelona when he scored the opening goal, after switching positions with Messi who played as a false 9, he was allowed to move between Ramos and Marcelo unmarked to get on the end of an excellent Iniesta through ball.

Iniesta

Iniesta’s role in the side has also adapted throughout the seasons. In the beginning he more commonly started on the right flank, where he would play as an interior in the right half space. The main reason behind this switch was the full-introduction of Messi as a false 9 which instigated a small change in shape.

(Although it should be mentioned that Iniesta played centrally for some big games such as the 6-2 defeat of Real Madrid when Messi started on the right wing).

Pedro was brought in to the right-wing where he could be of more a direct attacking threat than the playmaking Iniesta, forcing him into the left central midfield position. As Pedro and Villa were constant goal threats from either flank, Messi could drop with more freedom.

 

During the first season, Barcelona’s right flank of Alves (RB) Xavi (RCM) and Iniesta (RW) was the best in the world and they would often direct their play through there, especially given the defensive nature of Abidal which often created a situational 3 man defence.

An example of Iniesta’s effectiveness and Barcelona’s circulation through the right half of the pitch can be found in their demolition of Sevilla in the 2008/2009 season.

1 – Iniesta receives the ball in the right half space and attracts 2 players to him. Using one of Guardiola’s ‘rules’, he baits the two players to him which creates space before playing a quick horizontal ball to Xavi who makes a first time return ball.

2 – The space opened up disconnects the two groups of Sevilla players and is open straight for Iniesta to run into.

Upon receiving the pass from Xavi, Iniesta in typical fashion is directly in the middle of 4 Sevilla players but has enough space to play through to Eto’o who can finish fairly easily.

With their only striker deep, Barcelona rely quite heavily on runners from midfield getting behind the opposition defensive line when they’re defending on the edge of their area. Therefore it is often needed that both Iniesta and Xavi play quite high up, leaving Busi to cover a large amount of space (which he is one of few capable) behind for both offensive (pressure relief and recycling of possession) and defensive (transitions and counterpressing) reasons.

The combination of the two occurs quite often and an example can be found in the below diagram as Xavi, Messi and Iniesta combine to create a beautiful goal.

 

1 – Without a striker there is no-one which the Malaga defence can mark without coming out of position. It could be said that Malaga’s right midfielder should’ve tracked Xavi’s run but with Iniesta the other side of him it would be very difficult as either way a player will be open as he doesn’t seem to know of Demichelis’ intentions.

2 – Xavi is for the most of this attack Barcelona’s highest central player and still sits off of the defensive line, forcing the centre-back to come out and meet him. The movement to move away from goal is evidently a dummy and this shows signs of a pre-meditated move rehearsed in practice. However with the unbelievable understanding between the trio of Iniesta, Messi and Xavi it is possible to be produced on the spot.

3 – Demichelis does this, leaving space behind and Iniesta makes an immediate run behind from the left half space in which he is completely unmarked despite having 3 players within 4 yards of him. This is one of the advantages of the half space as no player knows who’s responsibility he is and the indecision costs them the goal ultimately.

1 – Valencia’s midfield block has shifted to the left half of the field, exposing the opposite space. This was a common occurrence from opposition teams as Barcelona circulated the ball into varying areas to utilise the whole width of the pitch.

2 – Iniesta making his usual half-space positioning is now in a vast space in which he can receive the horizontal pass.

The key aspect of this play is how Iniesta’s positioning lets him bypass the opposition midfield line as they simply pass ‘around’ it despite being fairly central in the left half space. From this position, Iniesta is free to run at the opposition or pick a better option with a pass, as you can see below he chooses the latter option.

Notice how immediately the opposition’s defence is exposed by a simple horizontal pass into space beyond the width that the opposition midfield line is covering.

This diagram shows the use of Iniesta in half-spaces to exploit these situations. The grey area, covers only around 40% of the width of the pitch and leaves the opposite half-space free for a switch of play. The blue line shows what space is covered on the whole by Valencia’s shape and due to the horizontal compaction of the midfield 3 only, the opposite half of the field is free as the right-winger doesn’t cover the space. Against Barcelona, the opposition’s coverage of space worsens progressively as the fatigue of chasing the ball becomes prevalent, resulting in the large majority choosing to sit deep and control as much space in their final 3^rd as they can with 10 men behind the ball.

Cruyff’s Diamond

One of the few snippets of Johan Cruijff’s genius on Youtube shows him explaining to a table of others the diamond formation and his interpretation of it. The system of Barcelona reflects this perfectly as the false 9 Messi drops to create the central diamond whilst both wingers are very high and wide to make the penetrative runs.

The central diamond which is key in everything Barcelona do often becomes assymetrical as a result of the different orientations of the carrileros Iniesta and Xavi. As I’ve stated previously, Iniesta’s positioning is often high upfield in the attacking midfield line generally around the left half space. From here he can utilise his excellent dribbling and passing to support Messi. On the opposite side Xavi plays a generally deep role (in phase 1 and 2) in order to help the development of possession. At these stages it often becomes more of a 2-2 in midfield as the diamond is lopsided.

With Iniesta higher they have another option to accelerate the tempo of the attack quickly as he sits behind the opposition midfield waiting for a precise vertical pass from his deeper teammates. In addition Barcelona’s ability to control the ball in the higher, more defensively-compact areas of the pitch is improved as they have two ‘needle players’ who are pressing resistant and excellent at playing through tight spaces.

‘Needle’ Players

Needle players are ones who are excellent dribblers and possess a fine close control of the ball. Their role in a team is generally to allow the maintaining of possession in the final third against compact teams and giving the ability to play short through these compact defensive blocks.

These types of players are absolutely vital for Barcelona’s playing style and as a result of their education, they have some of the best in the world with Iniesta and Messi being two prime examples. Creating the 2-2 ‘square’ in the midfield, Iniesta plays high alongside Messi between the opposition midfield and defence, in such space where the opposition are the most compact when defending deep.

A large responsibility is placed on the duo to help Barcelona play through these games where the opposition sit deep and compact, with their pressing resistance allowing them to sustain the pressure that Barca will enforce around the opposition’s penalty area.

Wingplay

For the goalscorers Barcelona have had in the positions of wingers, they haven’t been as prolific as they have the potential to with the likes of Henry and Villa never reached the goalscoring heights that they did as strikers.

This was all down to their special teammate, Messi. When Guardiola first came into the 1^st team as manager, it was obvious that the team needed to be tailored around Messi (hence his movement from right-wing to striker) as the likes of Ronaldinho, Eto’o and Ibrahimovic all shifted out in favour of the Argentinian.

In support of Messi then, the wingers were instructed to maintain width at all times as they stretched the opposition backline and allowed Messi to drop deep without the defensive line pushing up as their movement and pace constantly threatened behind.

By staying on the touchline, Pedro and Villa (or the wingers at the time) prevented the opposition from becoming horizontally compact which would’ve made it more difficult for the central trio of Messi, Xavi and Iniesta to play through the middle which they did to such success.

Another advantage of their wide play was that it allowed them to force 1v1 situations against the opposition full-back, in which they thrived with their excellent technical ability and dribbling.

1 – With such horizontal compaction in the centre with 7 Madrid players against 2 Barcelona, it was very unlikely that Guardiola’s team would be able to play through.

2 – As a result, Pedro can stay wide and isolate Marcelo into a 1v1 situation which would provide a better situation for Barcelona with more potential to create a chance.

As you can see from the above .gif, Barcelona were able to create a good chance from a difficult position originally.

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PART TWO: THE 3-3-4 SYSTEM